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I. INTRODUCTION
Death is not a momentary leap.
PROFESSOR VLADIMIR NAGOVSKY, M.D.
In the early morning hours of December 3, 1967, Louis Wash-
kansky received a new heart. Since the announcement of that opera-
tion, the idea of transplanting human organs from one person to
another has fascinated the world. It has also raised for public dis-
cussion the question, among others, of what is meant by the term
"death." Basically, how could the person whose heart was implanted
into Mr. Washkansky's chest be dead when that person, rather
dearly, had a viable and functional heart?
We shall attempt to analyze in this paper the legal aspect of
this question. In order to do this it will be necessary first to explore
the medical principles relating to the physiology of death. Only
after these medical principles are understood will it be profitable to
analyze the legal problems created by their application. Legal doc-
trine and theory can be useful as a guide to action only in relation
to the facts which set the parameters of the problem and the alter-
natives available.
Until very recent times the physician and the layman alike
used the same criteria for determining when a person crossed the
seemingly clear-cut border between life and death. When a person's
heart stopped beating and he stopped breathing, he was dead; this
phenomenon is usually termed "clinical death." The standard is
based on the medical fact that respiration, heart action, and brain
function are closely related to each other, and the cessation of any
one of them will bring the other two to a halt within a very few
minutes. Indeed, this standard has been so pervasive that one looks
in vain for any legal definition of death.
In recent years, however, a whole group of life-supporting
devices and techniques have become available. These machines have
modified the earlier, unconditional interplay of circulation, respira-
tion, and brain activity. It is now possible to compensate for defi-
* LL.B., University of Pennsylvania (1968). The author is currently serving as
Law clerk to Chief Judge Ralph M. Freeman of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan.
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dencies in heart action or respiration in some situations. A major
problem occasioned by advances in life support techniques is deter-
mining when these machines may be turned off and removed from
the patient whose brain is permanently unable to function.
At the same time medical science is rapidly expanding the list
of body parts which it can successfully transplant from one person
to another. On the basis of extensive work on dogs and other animals,
and in many cases substantiated by trials in man, the technical feasi-
bility of transferring bone, bone marrow, lymphoid tissue, cartilage,
extensive areas of skin, corneas, some endocrine organs such as
ovaries and the parathyroid, kidneys, hearts, lungs, livers, the uterus,
segments of small intestine, and even entire limbs is firmly estab-
lished.1 With this advance, the point of death takes on the added
importance of determining when a physician may remove vital
organs needed for transplantation into the recipient patient.
Having stated what issues we shall be concerned with, it is im-
portant to note here certain issues with which we are not concerned.
First is the question of consent by the donor or next of kin for re-
moval of the organs after death. In the absence of a dear statute2
the problem of obtaining the necessary permission for the removal
of the organs is at best difficult.3 This paper will assume that the
necessary consent has been obtained for the removal of the desired
organs.
Second, we are not concerned with euthanasia. The term "eu-
thanasia" implies the artificial shortening of a life which would
otherwise continue. When discussing euthanasia, it is assumed that
one knows when the victim is dead or alive. The problem faced in
this paper is one step removed: When is the patient alive, in which
case treatment will continue, or dead, in which case even treatment
will cease.4
1 Billingham, Tissue Transplantation; Scope and Prospect, 153 Sci. 266, 267 (1966).
2 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32-364.1 (1950); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.01-2108.03
(Page 1967).
3 E.g., Mfasden v. Harrison, Equity No. 68651, (Pa. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12, 1957);
Huskey v. Harrison, Equity No. 68666, (Pa. Sup. Jud. Ct., Aug. 30, 1957); In re Edwin
Dickinson (P. Ct. of Darien, Conn., Nov. 4, 1960). Cf., Brown v. Broome County, 8
N.Y.2d 330, 170 N.E.2d 666 (1960). See also, C. WAsmuns, LAW FOR THE PHYSICIAN
450-460 (1966). Cf. the question of relative's consent infra note 36.
4 In practice, the distinction may not be as clear as stated above. A subtle change
of the definition of "life" or "death" could be of critical importance in any given case
charging euthanasia. Indeed, this is one reason why there must be an agreed definition
of "death" and "life:'
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Having the benefit of these preliminary observations, we shall
turn first to an examination of certain salient medical facts in the
field of physiology which have challenged our concept of death and,
second, to an analysis of the legal problems which arise from the
application of these principles by the physician in determining the
time of death.
II. THE MEDICAL PARAME1ERS
The basic medical phenomenon is simply stated: The various
types of cells in the body succumb to a lack of oxygen at different
rates. Certain brain cells cannot withstand an interruption in circu-
lation, and therefore oxygen supply, for more than three to six min-
utes. Other cells are viable 24 hours after cessation of circulation.
However, we are concerned with considerably more than the
mere survival of a given type of cell. The cell must be able to re-
sume its normal functioning. Cells are organized into groups which
have specific tasks to perform. Groups of cells, in turn, may be
formed of essentially the same kinds of cells or they may be formed
of a great variety of cell types with varying susceptibility to anoxia
(lack of oxygen); compare, for example, the kidney to an arm muscle.
It is these organized groups of cells which must, as an entity, resume
their normal functions.
If we were able to determine the length of time during which
such a structured mass of cells (particularly an organ) could continue
without oxygen and yet resume its normal functioning upon re-
sumption of its oxygen supply, we would know the time limit from
the cessation of circulation which is available before irreversible
changes occur in the given organ. This information would indicate,
among other things, the length of time during which a transplanta-
tion surgeon would be able to remove and perfuse5 the organ.
Indeed, a tissue is defined as living when, returned to normal
surroundings and blood supply, it will resume its use of oxygen for
burning fuel (sugar) so as to carry out all of its normal cellular func-
tions in a normal way. It may be added that "the state of liveliness
(known as viability) of all these tissues depends upon the length of
time they have lacked blood supply and their temperature during
that time."6
The critical factors then in preserving the vitality of tissue, for
transplantation or otherwise, are time and temperature. The critical
5 To immerse and suffuse with a nutrient and oxygenated solution.
a F. MooRE, GIvE AND TAKE 133 (1964).
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time is that which elapses between the cessation of circulation and
its reestablishment. The critical temperature is that of the tissue
during the ischemic7 interval.8
The critical temperature for most tissues appears to be around
250 C. (770 F.). Below this temperature, many tissues can be
kept alive for several hours without blood flow. If the tempera-
ture is reduced to 150 C., (590 F.), or lower to the freezing point,
additional preservation is gained, but there are several problems
of damage to tissue, particularly if freezing is produced and the
cells swell and break.9
In seeking the donation of organs or other tissue, the time-tem-
perature curve begins its inexorable demands at the moment circula-
tion ceases. Noncritical tissues can be removed at leisure after death.
Their value is not diminished by delay of even several hours. Both
skin and cornea must be viable to be useful as grafts, and both
benefit from the more rapid cooling afforded by their surface loca-
tion. When skin is removed in less than 12 hours from the time of
death and stored at 4 to 5°C., it survives for at least three weeks; if
rapidly frozen and stored at about -8 0 C., it survives for at least one
year. Cornea may be harvested as long as eight hours after death; it
is stored at 40 C. and transplanted as soon as possible.
In contrast to the cornea and to skin, kidneys deteriorate ra-
pidly, and in order that they may survive and function, they must
be obtained from the donor within an hour of the cessation of
circulation at normal body temperature. It has also been established
that the kidney will survive ischemic intervals of at least six hours
when stored at 5°C. and will often survive for 24 hours if continu-
ously perfused with an oxygenated mixture of autologous blood 0
and balanced salt solution.
One other point might be noted relative to the kidney. As the
length of the ischemic interval increases, the damage to the kidney
is proportionately increased, albeit temporarily. Since a machine
capable of approximating some of the functions of kidneys exists,
it is possible to transplant a kidney which, while not capable of
resuming its normal functioning immediately upon restoration of
circulation, is capable of recovery in the course of a few weeks. At
present, the only machine capable of substituting for an organ is
7 Period during which blood flow is interrupted.
8 F. MooRE, supra note 6, at 135.
9 Id., at 156.
10 Blood taken from the donor of the organ.
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the "artificial" kidney. Consequently, the advantages of removing
organs as near to the time of cessation of circulation as possible is
more obvious with organs other than kidneys.'
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved, we may look forward
to the transplantation of the liver, lungs, and heart. None of these
organs (except for the heart) has been successfully transplanted in
man with long-term results. Each is substantially less able to withstand
a lack of oxygen than are the kidneys. Here we are speaking more in
terms of ten or fifteen minutes from the cessation of circulation, at
normal body temperature, rather than an hour. Yet, these trans-
plants must work reasonably well immediately upon insertion, at
least with respect to the heart and lungs. It may also be noted that
these organs may have begun to become anoxic in the last minutes
of the donor's life as the result of faulty circulation and consequent
reduction in oxygen supply. Given the critical time frame within
which the transplant surgeon has to operate relative to these three
organs, this factor of tissue viability is of the utmost importance.
Finally, and of particular interest to the physician who must
determine whether to institute further life support measures or to
withdraw those presently in operation, there is the problem that the
most highly organized cells in the body are brain cells, and that the
brain itself is composed of cells varying in complexity and, therefore,
varying in their ability to withstand a lack of oxygen. The most
highly organized cells in the brain are the nerve cells of the cerebral
cortex. At normal body temperature these cells can survive complete
arrest of circulation for not more than three to six minutes, after
which they degenerate and the cerebral cortex loses the last of its
functional vitality.12 By contrast, the cells found in the mid-brain
and brain stem are more resistant to anoxia and will survive for
up to fiifteen minutes in the absence of oxygen. The significance of
these facts will be immediately grasped when it is realized that the
thinking or conscious element of man's mental activity takes place
in the cerebral cortex of the brain-the area with the least ability
to withstand an interruption of oxygen supply. The brain stem on
the other hand controls the so-called vital functions, such as respira-
tion and temperature control. In short, anoxia destroys the function-
ing of the brain in the reverse order as these functions appear on
11 ETHICS IN MEDICAL PROGRESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TRANSPLANTATION
157 (G. Wolstenholme & M. O'Conner ed. 1966) [hereinafter Cited as MEDICAL ETHICS].
12 Nagovsky & Soboleva, Delaying the Process of Death, DiscovwRy 1-2 (1964).
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the phylogenic ladder.' 3 Respiration is one of the most phylogenically
ancient brain functions and is, accordingly, one of the last to go.
In those cases of cardiac arrest in which the patient is
revived, the flow of blood has been restored to the brain before
the brain was irrevocably damaged. It is for this reason that
there is such an urgency for speed and effectiveness in restoring
the heart beat after a cardiac arrest. If, however, this cessation
of heart beat persists at normal body temperature for more than
eight to ten minutes, then ... the patient is dead because the
brain is dead.14
If a heartbeat is restored after a cardiac arrest, but not before the
cells of the cerebral cortex (the thinking center of the brain) have
been irreversibly damaged, the patient will never regain conscious-
ness, even though he has a heartbeat (it should be realized that heart
action is only partially controlled by the brain or the central nervous
system) and he is breathing, with or without the aid of a respirator.
The standard of clinical death (i.e., lack of heartbeat and respira-
tion) is based on the inter-relationship between respiration, heart-
beat, and brain activity. If any one of these centers were to stop
functioning, the other two would, if left alone, soon cease func-
tioning also.
In the past twenty or thirty years, medical science has found
ways of aiding or even totally taking over certain of these functions.
The heart-lung machine has been developed to take over the func-
tions of pumping the blood through the circulatory system and of
oxygenating that blood. Such a machine is necessary if the surgeon is
to be able to stop his patient's heart long enough to repair it. While
on this machine, the patient's blood, instead of going through his
heart and lungs, is bypassed to the machine. However, the machine
does cause slight damage to blood cells passing through it, and a
patient can only be kept on it for a period of eight to ten hours.
To aid the heart with an irregular or unduly sluggish beat, the
electronic pacemaker has been developed. So long as the tissues of
the heart are otherwise in good health, this machine will keep it
13 "Phylogeny" refers to the developmental history of animals. Animals with very
simple structures lack many of the capacities of more complicated animals. They may
lack sight, hearing, smell, and internal temperature control. As animal structures
become more complicated, these capacities begin to appear. It is to the order of
appearance of such capacities in the more complex animals that "phylogenic ladder"
refers.
14 F. Moore, supra note 6, at 132.
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beating at a pre-determined rate by means of electrical impulses. To
aid the patient who is unable to breathe for himself, respirators are
in common use.
These machines, like others that are in use, were designed to
meet the situation involving a temporary interference with the
patient's own relevant physiologic process. As they came into use,
however, physicians found themselves faced with an ethical, moral,
and perhaps legal problem of the first magnitude.
The accepted standard of death was that of clinical death; the
criterion of brain activity had been left out of the equation. This
omission was no doubt due to the fact that until very recently there
was no way of diagnosing brain death and, even if there were, it was
unnecessary. Now the physician is faced with a situation which un-
til this time had been moot. He found himself maintaining with
machines the patient's respiration or heartbeat or both-the very
functions the absence of which were the basis for diagnosing and
certifying death.15 In the absence of brain activity was he permitted
to turn off the machines? Would he be considered to have killed
his own patient by such an act?
The ability of respirators and heart stimulators to maintain the
look of life in the face of death (meaning brain death) has prompted
Dr. Hamlin to suggest:
The sanctity of human life is not generated by cardiac signs
of its presence or absence when the brain is already dead....
Certainly the human spirit that emerges in man's unique in-
dividuality is the product of his brain, not his heart. The heart
is the symbol for love, happy birthday, St. Valentine . . . and
sentimental wishful thinking in general.16
Turning once again to the field of transplanation, it is dear that
an organ must be functionally intact if it is to be of any use, thus
requiring its removal from the body of the corpse as soon as possible
after death. In the case of kidneys, viability is compromised one hour
after the cessation of circulation. The heart and lung require earlier
removal to be viable. Time therefore is of the essence.
With respect to kidney transplantation (most of the figures
available deal with renal transplants, since these are the most com-
mon), it has been estimated that in the United States alone, in 1963
over 21,000 patients died from renal disease. Of these, 7500 died
from nephritis and nephrosis, both of which can sometimes be suc-
15 Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112, 113 (1964).
16 Id.
[Vol. so
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cessfully treated through transplantation. One may expect that this
indicated need for renal transplants will increase both as a function
of the general increase in population and added longevity. More-
over, the artificial kidney is not a desirable alternative for situations
where transplantation is indicated. The artificial kidney (i.e., chronic
dialysis) can maintain normal blood electrolyte values but some
functions of the normal kidney cannot be duplicated and are not
restored. Following transplanation, the patient is more alert, has
more stamina, and is free of the umbilical cord tying him to the
machine every week.17
Today, renal transplantation is no longer an uncommon event.
Since 1955 more than 1,000 people have received kidney grafts. The
results are still unpredictable since the rejection phenomenon has
not been entirely defeated. However, on the average, a patient re-
ceiving a kidney homograft today can expect at least two years of
normally active life. It has been predicted that if research is main-
tained at the present rate, medicine should within a decade be able
to give its patients something approaching a normal life expectancy.18
To the present, the major problem confronting the transplant
surgeon has been the rejection phenomenon-the process by which
the recipient's body destroys the implanted tissue or organ as a func-
tioning unit. It is generally conceded now that the solution to this
problem is practically within reach.19 Once the rejection phenomenon
is overcome, the acquisition of useful and viable organs in sufficient
numbers may well become a central problem in this area.
Looking into the future one may confidently expect that lungs,
livers, and hearts will come to be transplanted just as kidneys and
corneas are now.2 0 The technical requirements of obtaining these
unpaired organs brings us back full circle to the question of death,
what it is and what it means.
Outside of the context of transplantation surgery, the problem
of defining death has been described as follows:
In the first place, death cannot be defined as the loss of all
vital functions because tissues removed from the body can be
kept alive in cultures for possibly hundreds of years. Secondly,
many people are now maintained in a sort of twilight state by
the use of machines which do the work of their lungs or their
17 MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 11, at 62.
IS Id. at 186.
19 BilUngharm, Tissue Transplantation; Scope and Prospects, 153 Smi. 266, 269
(1966).
20 MEDICAL ETHICS supra note 11, at 63-64.
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heart while they are completely unconscious. Everybody treat-
ing accident cases and neurological cases is familiar with this
fact. Many of these people will never resume an independent
existence away from the machine, but they can't stay on the
machines forever and ever. There just aren't the machines.
There isn't the space to park these people. One has to decide
therefore when to switch off the machines, and this question
arises quite independently of considerations about transplants. 21
Dr. Schriner has suggested that:
We may be developing a moral problem in the opposite
direction. We have seen patients with a virtual transection of
the brain kept alive for days and days simply because there
was an intact cardiovascular system and a respirator. The prob-
lem is that the clinician or physician has to decide, from a set
of criteria, at which point he will stop employing extraordinary
means for the prolongation of life. Some research on the criteria
is essential, not just for transplantation but to decide how many
ribs to break for cardiac massage, or how many old people
should unnecesarily be subjected to thousands of dollars worth
of resuscitation, or whether it is ever possible to die without
a series of cardiac arrests. 22
This is as far as the science of medicine can take us in our effort
to articulate a concept of death. The physician cannot define death,
but he can and has provided us with the factual foundation around
which our discussion will resolve.
We have been confronted with the following facts. First, the
cells of the body die at differing rates once their supply of oxygen
has been interrupted. Second, the more highly organized the cell the
more quickly it will be destroyed by a lack of oxygen. Third, the
most highly organized cells in the body are found in the cerebral
cortex of the brain. This area of the brain might well be termed the
"center of consciousness." Fourth, certain organs such as the liver,
heart, and lungs are only slightly less susceptible than the brain to
the effects of anoxia. Fifth, at the present state of medical technology
or that which may be expected to develop within the next five years,
it will be possible to transplant all of the major organs of the body,
other than the brain itself, from one person to another. Sixth, many
of the organs for transplantation must be acquired from cadaver
donors since life cannot be sustained in their absence. Seventh, in
the medical profession the traditional criteria for determining death
have been an absence of respiration and heartbeat for about five
21 Id. at 71.
22 Id. at 73-74.
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minutes. And eighth, machines and procedures are in common use
today which will aid or even completely take over the functions of
respiration and heartbeat.
From these facts, it is possible to formulate several concepts of
death. If the concept of life is felt to imply that it must have or be
capable of having some meaning to the actor, the concept of death
must be tied to brain function. At the point where sufficient brain
damage has occurred to preclude the possibility of psychic function-
ing, the patient has become "brain dead." On the other hand, if the
concept of life implies no more than physiologic existence, the defini-
tion of death must be tied to the function of circulation, i.e., the
heart.
III. THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
The legal system has had no compelling reason in the past to
articulate a concept of death. The gray area, described in the first
part of this paper, simply did not exist until recent medical ad-
vances made it possible to maintain a patient in this state. Conse-
quently, defining death has not been a problem for lawmakers. Very
little legislation refers to death and that which does, does not define
it. For example, a review of the Pennsylvania statutes will reveal the
implicit assumption that one knows when a person is dead. The
statutes provide only that no person may "sign a death certificate"
unless "he or she has.., first received a certificate of licensure from
the board (of medical examiners) .... "23 A "dead body" is defined as
"(i) a lifeless human body, or (ii) such parts of a human body as
permits a reasonable inference that death has ocurred."2 4 One will
search the Pennsylvania and Ohio decisions in vain to find a defini-
tive judicial formulation of the meaning of "death." In the courts,
death has been treated as an objective fact to be established by a doc-
tor's certification or other competent evidence.
The closest the law comes to defining death is to raise a presump-
tion of death in those cases where no body can be found, whether
because of desertion or some other event.25 This is not a definition;
23 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 401a (1963).
24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 450.105 (1964). Ohio law does not even attempt a
definition.
25 See Grouer v. Supreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of the World, 265 Pa.
129, 108 A. 437 (1919) (Insured traveled but kept in contact with wife; letters stopped
in 1909; extensive efforts to locate him; wife sues on insurance policy; held: insured
comes within rule that seven years' unexplained absence raises presumption of death.);
McNulty v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 153 Pa. Super. 288, 33 A-2d 796 (1943) (Insured
1969]
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it is merely a legal assumption that "death," whatever it is, has
occurred.
Another problem facing the courts has been to establish the
time of death.26 In deciding this issue, the courts have adopted the
operative concept of clinical death,27 if for no other reason than
that no other concept has been available.
The issue of when death has occurred, or if it has occurred, has
come up in the context of an action by third parties to determine
rights in property or similar contexts. More precisely, the courts have
been asked to decree that those legal rights and duties which are
altered at a person's death shall be determined as if the person were
left home April 1934; last located September 1945; held: rule of seven years' unex-
plained absence operated to raise presumption of death); In Re Hoffman's Estate, 8
Erie 19 (Pa. Orphans' Ct., 1925) (Daughter of decedent not heard from for 30 years;
no evidence to show that she had not married in interval or had children; held: her
share of mother's estate paid into daughter's estate and letters of administration to
issue on daughter's estate.); Tilton's Petition, 46 Birks 265 (Pa. Orphans' Ct., 1954)
(Petitioner's husband drafted in German Army; wrote weekly until August 20, 1944;
not heard from since in spite of inquiries; held: husband presumed dead as of August
31, 1944, and petitioner's marriage license directed to be issued). See also Brunny v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 151 Ohio St. 86, 84 N.E.2d 504 (1949) (Suit by W on H's life
insurance; H left home in 1936; H last heard from in 1936; H declared dead by
Probate Court in 1943; defendant introduces deposition taken in 1946 of person claim-
ing to be H; held: presumption of death overcome); In Re McXVilson's Estate, 155
Ohio St. 261, 98 N.E.2d 289 (1951) (son disappeared from home in 1936; not heard from
again; father brings proceedings to declare him dead; held: presumption of death
arises since son not heard from for over seven years and presumption of death arises
in 1949, date of Probate Court's final order, under Ohio General Code § 10509-25.);
White v. Indus. Comm'n., 102 Ohio App. 236, 142 N.E.2d 549 (1956) (H marries TV,
in 1923; separated one week later; W never heard from again; H married TV.; held:
W1 presumed dead, not having been heard from for over seven years, and therefore,
W 2 is H's widow.)
26 See Freiberg v. Schloss, 50 Ohio Op. 156, 112 N.E.2d 352 (1953) (Alice Seeman
deported from her home in Wurzburg, Germany to Poland in 1942 under circumstances
to convince court that she was executed shortly thereafter; held: date of death set at
1942 rather than seven years later). See also OHIo REv. CODE ANN., § 2105.1 and
§ 2121.01 et seq. (Page 1968); In Re Metzger's Estate, 140 Ohio St. 50, 42 N.E.2d 443
(1942); Ostrander v. Pierce, 129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N.E. 670 (1935).
27 Compare In re Kimmey's Estate, 326 Pa. 33, 191 A. 47 (1937). (Driver lurched
toward wife; car went off road and over ravine into river; less water found in husband's
lungs than wife's; driver had history of heart disease; car skidded before going over
ravine; held: Insufficient evidence to establish that wife survived husband.), with In Re
Saligman's Estate, 130 D & C 2d 432 (Pa. Orphans' Ct., 1957). (Witness saw husband
and wife just after fire; husband cold to touch and not breathing; wife warm and
breathing; doctor arrived 25 minutes later and declared both dead and had no opinion
as to who died first; held: wife survived husband, thus becoming sole owner of prop-
erty held by the entireties with husband.).
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dead, and to state the date from which these rights shall be so de-
termined.
The advent of resuscitative devices has presented the law with
a set of entirely new problems; these center on whether a doctor may
terminate therapy to a brain-dead patient. The line between life and
death is no longer sharp or dear. Most important, however, the time
of death may be conditional and dependent upon forces outside,
rather than inside, the patient, such as availability and efficiency of
special hospital equipment and decisions as to its use or discon-
tinuation. Furthermore, decisions concerning such use or discontinu-
ation may be influenced by the physician's concept of life and death.
This is not the only important aspect of the problem of defining
"death." The future of transplantation surgery is in the balance, at
least with respect to the use of some of the vital organs. The period
of time during which these organs remain viable after circulation
stops is measured in minutes. Thus, whatever concept of death is
adopted, it must be capable of being discerned within the period
during which the most sensitive organ can survive without oxygen,
unless we are prepared to make the transplanation of this organ, and
perhaps others, impossible. In this field we are concerned with the
fate of both the donor of the organ and the recipient.
In the background of any discussion of death is the question of
public confidence in our hospitals and the medical profession itself.
Even the basic principles of medicine are not well understood by
the average person-the future patient. He has been brought up to
believe that heartbeat and respiration are synonymous with life and
their absence with death. Now he is to be told that a person can
have a heartbeat and respiration and be dead, and this on the basis
of principles with which he is not conversant. Whether the average
layman will accept this proposition, even after an appropriate educa-
tional effort, cannot be answered here. In any case, one may con-
sider whether the legal system could be useful in legitimating the
concept of brain death.
Finally, the place of the courts relative to the regulation of the
practice of medicine must be pondered. Courts have recognized that
they are not proper institutions to determine alone what standard
of care a physician must meet in ministering to his patient. When
faced with the necessity of deciding issues of this kind, the courts
have looked to the standard of medical practice in the community.28
28 Robinson v. Wirts, 387 Pa. 291, 127 A.2d 706 (1956); but see Smith v. Yohe,
412 Pa. 94, 194 A.2d 167 (1963). Cf. Rush v. Akron General Hospital, 84 Ohio L. Abs.
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The standard of death which a physician uses is founded on medical
principles blended with experience. How is a court to evaluate his
judgment and at what stage, before or after termination of treat-
ment? What kind of action can a court take when it disagrees with
the physician's diagnosis of death? These are only two of the most
obvious questions that must be answered if the legal system is to
take a more active role in regulating even this aspect of medical
practice through the instrumentality of its courts.
Below we shall explore the threshold question of whether the
concept of death is merely a question of medical judgment or
whether the law has independent interests of sufficient consequence
to warrant an attempt to articulate its own concept of death.
A. The Physician's View
Some have suggested that determining the point at which death
may be said to occur is solely a medical question. It is pointed out
that the physician's entire life is dedicated to the struggle to prevent,
or at least postpone, death. To this end the physician treats his pa-
tient. In this view, the physician is in the best position to know when
the struggle has been lost-when his patient is dead.
Closely related to this point is the conceded fact that, whatever
the definition of death, informed and experienced medical judgment
is necessary to diagnose when death has taken place. Here a logical
distinction should be made between defining the point at which
death may be said to occur and the method of determining if a given
patient has reached that point. The diagnosis of death is dearly
within the area of medical judgment; no one else is competent to
make this decision. The concept of death must equally be founded
upon sound medical principles and be capable of modification as
medical advances are made. One of the physician's greatest fears
centers on the possibility of uninformed legal decisions in this area
or the inability of the law, if it once sets a definition of death, to re-
spond readily to medical advances. Neither fear is unfounded.
A French decree issued in 1948 by the Minister of Health and
Population 9 set forth several rules relating to the certification of
death. According to these rules, apparently still in force, death must
be declared by two physicians and the early diagnosis of death is to
292, 171 N.E.2d 378 (1957); but see Morgan v. Sheppard, 91 Ohio L. Abs. 579, 188
N.E.2d 808 (1963).
29 From an abstract of a decree signed by the Minister of Health and Population,
February 3, 1948, in Paris, France.
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be established, in addition to direct examination, by two methods.
The first is arteriotomy and the second, injection of fluorescein, a
dye. The instructions state that the radial or temporal artery is to
be incised with a scalpel. Should blood fail to flow, it is recommended
that another arteriotomy on the opposite side of the body be made
before making a finding of death. A fluorescein test is also recom-
mended but not insisted upon, whereby an intravenous injection of
fluorescein is made. If the patient is alive, the conjunctiva and
mucosa of the eye will take on a greenish-yellow coloration within
one half hour.
Such a test might have been appropriate in 1948. The effect of
insisting upon such a procedure now is to require that a patient be
maintained on a respirator, or other resuscitative devices, whether
or not the patient has any chance of recovering consciousness. This
problem was not even envisaged, in all probability, when the decree
was drafted. If the fluorescein test is used, the development of trans-
plantation surgery will be severely hampered since several organs
are not viable after such a long ischemic interval.
While this example has dealt with statutory and administrative
law, the question of what the courts, as legal institutions, can do
in solving the problems raised by the new techniques of resuscitation
must still be faced. Maintaining the physiologic functioning of a
patient who has undergone irreversible cerebral damage is not a
mere matter of keeping the respirator on; this treatment requires
continuing decisions relative to maintaining proper blood electrolyte
levels and maintaining body temperature and blood pressure within
acceptable limits. It is precisely in the field of treatment where the
courts have deferred to the expertise of the physician. Yet, the spectre
of a court directing a physician to continue to treat a patient, in spite
of the fact that the physician is convinced that the patient will never
regain consciousness, is quite possible if the courts enter the area of
defining death. A court is not equipped for such a venture. How
would such an order be drawn up? What would be the physician's
duties during the various emergencies that arise when treating pa-
tients of this kind? When could the physician declare the patient
dead? It is clear that the court must rely upon the integrity of the
physician treating the patient. Ultimately, the patient's fate lies in
the skill and knowledge of the treating physician.
One may wonder whether the medical profession will come to a
working concept of death which is significantly different from that
which an informed judge or legislature would adopt. If the medical
1969"1
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definition would be substantially the same, the legal system would
be well advised to ratify that definition as appropriate, leaving medi-
cine ample leeway for future development.
Finally, it is suggested that the fundamental concept of death
has not undergone a change. One medical dictionary defines death
as "the apparent extinction of life as manifested by absence of heart-
beat and respiration."30 (Emphasis added.) Notice that death is not
defined as the absence of heartbeat and respiration. Basically, this
definition requires the permanent nonfunctioning of (i.e., irreversible
damage to) a vital organ. Historically, concern has centered on the
heart. If this function could not be maintained, the patient lapsed
into unconsciousness very quickly and brain function ceased shortly
thereafter. Attention has centered on heartbeat and respiration be-
cause their permanent interruption caused other, immediate con-
sequences to brain function. Given a patient with cardiac arrest,
other things being equal, the doctor will attempt to revive heart ac-
tion for perhaps six minutes. Yet, we know that the muscle tissue of
the heart is viable for a period of significantly more than six minutes.
In deciding when to stop his efforts, the physician is considering
when, in his judgment, the brain cannot resume functioning.
Total kidney failure, absent mechanical intervention, will have
the same ultimate result. However, the dying patient will remain
conscious for an extended period, lapse into a coma, and then un-
dergo clinical death. The time sequence and physiologic mechanism
of death are totally different from that connected with a cessation
of respiration or heartbeat but are just as sure. The important dif-
ference for our purpose is brain function. If this view is proper,
then, the continuation of vital functions, including heartbeat and
respiration, is pointless if the patient cannot regain consciousness.
This much is implicit, on one reading, in the concept of clinical
death.
B. The Lawyer's View
Others would suggest that the issues involved in defining death
go well beyond the teachings of any science, even medicine. They
would say that the purpose for which scientific techniques or prin-
ciples are used must be defined on the basis of normative, ethical
and moral principles.
When medicine adopted the standard of clinical death, the
30 Do1LAND, ILLusmain MEDICAL DICTIONARY 387 (24th ed., 1965).
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propriety of its action could not be challenged on the basis of such
principles. Medicine was simply recognizing what nature had or-
dained: Life could not continue absent heartbeat and respiration.
Now, however, medicine has begun to restore the function of vital
organs or compensate for their nonfunction. In this new context
medical decisions are being made which are based not on "scientific"
fact but on the physician's concept of life and death. A determina-
tion of when life is meaningful to its possessor seems to be at the
foundation of the decisions concerning when to terminate therapy.
But the question of when life is meaningful has been debated by
theologians and philosophers for centuries; no agreed conclusion has
been reached.31
Today's religious leaders, however, do appear to agree that the
concept of brain death is permissible. Pope Pius XII gave the Cath-
olic position when he said that human life continues for as long as
the vital functions are carried on spontaneously without the help of
artificial means. He was asked in 1957 at what point a doctor could
stop artificial respiration to a patient who he was convinced could
never regain consciousness. The Pope replied that the respirator and
other systems for aiding circulation were extraordinary systems for
prolonging life and that physicians were not obligated to give extra-
ordinary treatment. During an
attempt at reanimation... the family may insist that the physi-
cian interrupt his efforts and the doctor can obey... even when
it involves the stopping of the circulation of the blood.32
Rabbi Immanuel Jakobivits, an authority on Jewish ethics, has
written that Jewish law permits, and sometimes even requires, the
withdrawal of any medication and of any other efforts that delay
death for a person suffering with an incurable disease.33
The theologians have said only that the idea of equating brain
death with "death" is permissible. They have not indicated who is
to make the ultimate decision. Is it to be the relatives, the physician,
the physician on the advice of the relatives, et cetera? What if the
relatives are divided on the subject? None of these questions has
31 See generally Guttentag, The Meaning of Death in Medical Theory, 17 STAN-
FoRD MEDICAL BULLETIN 165 (1959).
32 Pope Pius XII: Allocution Delivered to the International Congress of Anes-
thesiologists, November 24, 1957, 49 Acta Apostolica Sedis 1027; cited in Hamlin, Life
and Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112, 121 (1964).
33 Kitay, ToDAY's HEALTH, 62-69 (May 1966).
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
been answered as yet. Many hospitals require the tacit consent 34 of
the relatives before discontinuing treatment to the brain-dead pa-
tient. Under such conditions few objections may be expected, but
as advances in resuscitation become more widespread, one may ques-
tion whether physicians will be willing to continue treatment of such
patients when the relatives refuse to accept the standard of brain
death. One may also ponder the legal vulnerability of hospitals and
physicians who do not presently require the express consent of rela-
tives as a condition precedent to the termination of treatment.
One may well question why the relatives are consulted at all in
this situation. If the brain-dead patient is not "dead," how can a
relative's consent legitimate the withdrawal of treatment? If such a
patient is "dead," the relative's consent is irrelevant. On balance, it
is suggested that we are witnessing a transition in the concept of
death. The medical profession is being quite solicitous of the rela-
tives' feelings as well as trying to protect itself.
A second difficulty centers on the question of whether the in-
terests of the organ donors and recipients are inconsistent. If the
law is to sanction the solicitation of an individual's consent to allow
the removal of vital organs from his body immediately after death,
it should insist that all necessary steps are taken to assure that such
person is not deprived of even the least chance of survival because
of the need for an organ. Assuming that insistence upon the standard
of clinical death would hinder the development of transplantation
surgery, the thrust of our concern as it relates to the concept of brain
death is whether this standard is too difficult of proof. It is one thing
for a physician to diagnose the existence of the state of brain death
where the only question involved is the continuation or termination
of treatment. It may be a different matter when the doctor knows that
another patient will die shortly unless he receives a new organ and
that the only source of this organ is the physician's patient. The
unconscious and unarticulated forces at work in the diagnosing
physician might well determine his diagnosis in a close case.
To the extent that one feels that this conflict is a significant
problem, one will attempt to find a mechanism for reviewing the
doctor's determination of death or insist that the standard of clinical
death be used. The difficulties involved in resolving this problem
satisfactorily by legal means will be brought out in the hypothetical
situations to be discussed in the next section of this paper.
34 This is not the written consent of relatives but rather a "sense" on the part of
the physician that they feel that discontinuation of treatment would be appropriate.
[Vol. 30
CONCEPT OF DEATH
Finally, the possibility of two concepts of death developing
around the one word "death" presents disquieting possibilities. If
the medical profession were to become divided, some doctors apply-
ing only the standard of clinical death, and others using the standard
of brain death in appropriate circumstances, a serious problem of
public confidence might develop and force the law to act. This kind
of division within the medical profession would almost certainly
lead to a crisis of confidence in medical treatment among laymen.
The patient has a right to know what standard is going to be used
in determining whether to continue treating him.
Such a division would also present the question of whether a
patient could choose for himself the standard to be applied and bind
the physician and hospital as to its use. In the past, the law has pro-
vided that the physician is free to carry out his professional duties as
he sees fit.35 But, it is a different matter to allow him to decide when
life has lost all meaning to his patient, particularly if the medical
profession is divided on the subject.
Implicit in the considerations just discussed is the thought that
traditional acceptance of the physician's freedom of action rests in
large part in a deference to his expertise. Such deference is seriously
undermined to the extent that one comes to feel that the decision
of where to set the point at which a person may be declared dead,
while requiring a knowledge of medical principles, rests on non-
medical considerations.
It is suggested that the proper function of the law relative to
defining death is dependent upon the nature of the question being
asked. For example, a court may well feel that it is appropriate to
examine the circumstances under which an organ is about to be re-
moved from a donor for transplantation and yet be unwilling to
review a physician's determination that further medical treatment
of a patient is useless because the patient is brain-dead when nothing
more is involved.
C. Hypotheticals
The difficulties facing the legal system as it determines its re-
sponse to the new questions created by advances in the field of re-
suscitation can be illustrated by posing four hypothetical situations
and examining some of the legal questions presented by each. In this
way it is possible to frame the more important issues as they would
arise in a legal proceeding and to find out how the relevant medical,
35 Donaldson v. Muffucci, 397 Pa. 548, 554, 156 A.2d 835, 838 (1960).
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legal, and social policies affect the resolution of the controversy. In
this manner it should be possible to specify what interests the legal
system has in the concept of death.
Case 1. The patient is a 17-year-old boy. He is in good health
except for an inflamed appendix. Toward the end of the operation
to remove the appendix, his heartbeat and breathing stop. No effort
is made to restore heart function or to ventilate the patient. The
parents sue the physician in charge of the operating room for mal-
practice in that he did not immediately institute resuscitative
measures.
Here there would be no disagreement between the medical and
legal professions. The physician is guilty of malpractice.3 6 In an
action at law it would be significant, if not decisive, that the failure
to institute resuscitative measures is contrary to general medical
practice, particularly where, as here, there is every reason to be-
lieve that the measure would be successful.
Resuscitative measures are not only appropriate but virtually
mandatory, because the patient must still be alive for some period
after his heartbeat and breathing stopped. Otherwise, it would be
pointless to attempt resuscitation and the failure to institute such
measures could not be the basis for a legal action.
This first hypothetical was chosen to begin our discussion in a
context where the medical and legal professions are on common
ground. It also illustrates a point of importance; it is implicit in the
requirement that resuscitative measures be attempted in a situation
of this kind that the cessation of heartbeat and breathing does not
in itself constitute death. Both medicine and the law must be look-
ing to some other standard in deciding if the patient is dead. The
only criterion which this writer can envisage is the possibility of
continued brain function, combined with the possibility of resumed
functioning of the vital organs (here heart action and breathing).
Case 2. On the first of March the patient suffered a ten-minute
interruption in circulation, at which point heart action was suc-
cessfully re-established; breathing was carried on with the aid of a
respirator. The patient's condition continued without improvement
for two weeks. On the 14th of March, the treating physician, after
consulting with several of his colleagues, concluded that the patient
had no chance of regaining consciousness because of irreversible
damage to the cerebral cortex. Upon being informed of this con-
36 Cf. Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital, 41 Cal. Rptr. 577, 597 P.2d 161, 165-67
(1965).
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clusion, the relatives insisted that the physician continue to treat the
patient. It is now March 25th and the physician has just notified the
relatives of his intention to terminate all treatment on the 27th of
March.
Several legal questions immediately present themselves. First,
can the next of kin prevent the physician from carrying out his in-
tention to terminate treatment.37 Basically, we are asking whether a
court should grant an injunction prohibiting the termination of
treatment by the physician.
The court is squarely faced with the question of whether it can
usefully act. The uncontested medical testimony is that the patient
cannot regain consciousness. Consequently, the defendant physician
has concluded that further treatment is of no value to the patient.
Moreover, to maintain a patient in this condition will require con-
tinuous and complex treatment by the medical staff. On what basis
is a court to override this determination and require further treat-
ment? There must come a point after which further treatment is
useless-where the physician has lost his battle against death.
It is arguable that the court is faced here with deciding two
more narrow questions, to wit: Is this patient, who is in a fairly
stable condition, "dead," or is he sufficiently hopeless, although
"alive," to permit the physician to terminate treatment? Petitioner
may well argue that since the condition of the patient is stable, it
cannot be said that his condition is so hopeless that a physician can
reasonably decide to cease treatment. We are not here counting
broken ribs in an emergency situation; we are dealing with a stable
condition. Consequently, the real decision being made by the physi-
cian is that life is no longer meaningful to his patient. This is not
a medical decision.
Although this contention is appealing, the condition of the
patient is not as stable as it may appear to the layman. The patient's
current state is maintained only by continuous therapy designed to
assure the proper biochemical balances required for metabolism. It
is not uncommon for patients in this condition to suffer frequent
medical emergencies. In the event that an order were issued directing
further treatment, what would it require of those treating the pa-
tient during one of these emergencies? When an emergency occurs,
the physician is in no position to ask for clarification of the order or
to relitigate the issue of death.
37 It is assumed that it is not practical to dismiss this physician and substitute
another in his place.
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On balance, a court would be unwise to issue an injunction re-
quiring the physician to continue the treatment of his patient under
these circumstances. To do so, a court would come perilously close
to entering the practice of medicine, a task for which it is not
equipped, either professionally or institutionally. A philosophical
problem is involved here, but the practical requirements of medical
practice appear to be decisive. A court is not familiar with the myriad
details arising in the maintenance of such a patient and, more im-
portantly, with the varying situations which might develop after an
order is entered. This is at least part of the reason that courts have
adopted the standard of conformity to professional custom when de-
termining malpractice cases. The reason of the rule is equally ap-
plicable here.
It is pertinent to note here that a case similar to the hypothetical
came before a Swedish court in 1960, in the form of a criminal
prosecution. The physician was acquitted by the district court with
the comment that "further administration of fluid could have served
no medical or human purpose. 38
The second type of legal question which may arise in this hypo-
thetical case is whether the patient, a legatee, survived a testator who
died on the 26th of March, assuming that the physician did terminate
treatment to the patient on the 27th of March. In deciding this
question, the court must set the time of death. The two most likely
times for denomination as the "moment of death" are the 14th of
March, when the physician diagnosed the patient's condition as
including irreversible brain damage, and the 27th of March, when
clinical death occurred after the respirator was disconnected.
The case of Smith v. Smith,39 provides a point of departure for
analysis. In this case, Mr. and Mrs. Smith were fatally injured in an
automobile accident on April 19, 1957. Mr. Smith died at the scene,
38 The facts of the case are given in MEDIcAl ETicHs, supra note 11, at 142-43.
It was there stated that:
In December, 1968, an 80-year-old woman with cerebral hemorrhage was
admitted to the Department of Internal Medicine of a hospital in northern
Sweden. She was unconscious and remained so. For two months she was given
fluids by the drip technique. After a brief improvement in her condition there
was a deterioration. In a conversation with the physician the relatives ex-
pressed their doubt as to whether there was any point in continuing the
treatment, which could not lead to her recovery. The physician agreed and
acted accordingly. (He discontinued the drip.) A week later the patient died
peacefully.
39 229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
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but efforts were made to resuscitate Mrs. Smith until May 6, 1957.
At no time did Mrs. Smith regain consciousness. Each left a will
leaving his or her property to the other. The administrator of Mr.
Smith's estate petitioned the probate court for a construction of both
wills. He alleged, inter alia, that both lost the power to will, power
to administer the estate of the other, and power to enjoy the estate
of the other at the same time. Since both lost all of these powers at
the same time, both lost the power to accept the bounty of the other
under the reciprocal wills. 40 The administrator of Mrs. Smith's will
demurred. The probate court sustained the demurrer. On appeal
the lower court was affirmed.
One of the allegations in the petition for construction of the
wills reads as follows:
THAT the said Hugh Smith and his wife, Lucy Coleman
Smith, were in an automobile accident on the 19th day of April,
1957, said accident being instantly fatal to each of them at the
same time, although the doctors maintained a vain hope of
survival and made every effort to revive and resuscitate said
Lucy Coleman Smith until May 6, 1957, when it was finally
determined by the attending physicians that their hope of
resuscitation and possible restoration of human life to the said
Lucy Coleman Smith was entirely vain, and
THAT as a matter of modern medical science, your petitioner
alleges and states, and will offer the Court competent proof that
the said Hugh Smith, deceased, and said Lucy Coleman Smith,
deceased, lost their power to will at the same instant, and that
their demise as earthly human beings occurred at the same time
in said automobile accident, neither of them ever regaining any
consciousness whatsoever.41
On this point, the Arkansas Supreme Court, after quoting the
definition of death found in Black's Law Dictionary,42 stated:
Admittedly, this condition did not exist, and as a matter of
fact, it would be too much of a strain on credulity for us to
believe any evidence offered to the effect that Mrs. Smith was
dead, scientifically or otherwise, unless the conditions set out in
the definition existed . . . . We take judicial notice that one
breathing, though unconscious, is not dead.43
40 Id. at 586, 317 S.W.2d at 279.
41 Id. at 582-83, 317 S.W.2d at 277.
42 "The cessation of life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total
stoppage of the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital func-
tions consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc ...... Id. at 586, 317
S.W.2d at 279.
48 Id. at 587, 317 S.W.2d at 279, 281.
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The Arkansas court was not prepared to make the time of death
retroactive to the time of injury causing death.
Although a court may not be willing to make death retroactive
in the sense attempted in Smith v. Smith, it must still determine the
moment of death for the purpose of determining inheritance in our
hypothetical. Moreover, it is clear that the medical considerations,
so important in passing on permissible conduct by the physician
toward his patient, are of much less consequence. Here it is desirable
to adopt a standard of death that is easily perceptible in order to
discourage undue litigation and provide substantially consistent re-
sults. 44 For this purpose, the court might well define death in terms
of heartbeat and respiration when deciding survivorship claims.
Case 3. The same medical situation exists as in case 2 above.
However, upon being informed of his wife's condition on the 14th
of March, the husband wishes further therapy to be stopped and
the physician refuses. The physician has concluded that the patient
is unable to recover consciousness, but he is unwilling to terminate
treatment prior to clinical death. It is assumed that the husband is
contractually liable for the medical expenses of his wife.
If the husband refuses to pay the physician's bill for services,
the first issue presented is whether the husband can raise the de-
fense of his wife's "death" in opposing the doctor's suit for payment.
There are certain attractions to admitting such a defense. The
physician-patient relationship is dissolved upon the death of the
patient. The cost of maintaining a person in the twilight state is
very high-approximately $150 per day. To take the position that a
person liable for the medical expenses of another must pay the cost
of maintaining the patient in this hopeless condition may well re-
sult in the bankruptcy of that person and his family, simply because
the treating physician declines to recognize the standard of brain
death as "death."
It might be suggested that a result of allowing this defense would
be to give the person contractually liable for the medical expenses
of another the practical power to decide whether the patient, in this
situation, shall receive treatment. Obviously, if the courts were to
hold that establishing the state of brain death constituted a defense
to further liability for medical expenses, physicians would be hesi-
tant to continue treatment in this situation. The standard of brain
death would indirectly be ordained by the courts as the operative
44 Many jurisdictions have enacted simultaneous death statutes for this very
purpose. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2105.21 (Page 1968).
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definition of death, unless the physicians and hospitals were pre-
pared to underwrite the costs of continued treatment of such patients.
If we are convinced that the standard of brain death is medically
proper, then why should not this defense be permitted? Since the
issue of brain death is in the nature of an affirmative defense, the
defendant would have the burden of proving that this condition
did exist. Thus, if there were any significant dispute as to the con-
dition of the patient, the court should find that the defense was not
established. Indeed, because of the difficulty of diagnosing the state
of brain death,45 and the consequences with respect to the discon-
tinuation of treatment following such a diagnosis, it would be wise
to require the defendant to meet a higher burden of persuasion in
establishing this defense than is normally involved in contract ac-
tions. This procedure should not place any more of a risk on the
physician than he presently has regarding the correctness of his
diagnoses. Allowing this defense, although requiring a high burden
of persuasion, might also prevent the evolution of two standards of
death growing up around the word "death."
If this defense is recognized and established in a given case, one
may speculate as to when the patient "died" for the purpose of de-
termining a survivorship claim. If, for example, a court held that
the patient in our hypothetical had reached the state of being brain-
dead on March 14, when the doctor diagnosed the condition, could
the court hold consistently that, for the purposes of a survivorship
claim, the patient died on March 27, when heart action and respira-
tion ceased? Nothing more can be said here that was not noted above.
However, the paradox of being "dead" for one purpose and "alive"
for another purpose is brought into sharp relief.
Case 4. The patient has been diagnosed as brain-dead and is
being maintained by a respirator. The treating physician and the
relatives agree that treatment should be terminated. The patient has
donated his organs for transplantation. Consequently, treatment is
continued so that the recipient can be prepared for surgery. Twenty-
four hours after the patient's condition was diagnosed, his liver is
removed and implanted into the recipient. After the operation,
therapy to the patient is terminated and clinical death takes place.
One problem presented here is whether the diagnosis of brain
death is a sufficient basis to support the removal of the patient's vital
organs. We have already concluded that this diagnosis will permit
45 Hamlin, Life or Death by EEG, 190 J.A.M.A. 112, 120 (1964).
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the treating physician to terminate all treatment to the patient. If
we are to say that it will not permit the transplant surgeon to re-
move an organ, we must be asserting that only the clinical death of
the patient will support such a procedure. The treating physician
can "cause" the clinical death of the patient but the transplant
surgeon cannot remove a vital organ before clinical death occurs.
Surely such a result is absurd.
Presumably, after clinical death, the transplant surgeon would
be permitted to restore circulation and respiration in the donor for
the purpose of maintaining the viability of the organs.46 Requiring
the patient to undergo clinical death is pointless. The only possible
reason for this requirement would be to be sure that the donor was
really dead. But, if we are not certain of his death, we have no basis
whatever for permitting the physician to discontinue treatment.
It may be asked whether a court should be consulted with re-
spect to declaring a patient dead when the removal of an organ is
contemplated. The standard of brain death may be acceptable, but
might the physician have a conflict of interest? On the one hand,
he has a patient whose life can be saved by the transplantation of an
organ and, on the other hand, he has a patient who has only the
most remote chance of survival.
This very difficult situation and the dangers inherent in it has
been recognized by the medical profession. There is little question
but that it is unethical for a physician to treat both the donor and
recipient. Only after the donor's physician has given up hope and
diagnosed the state of brain death can the transplant team ethically
act or otherwise intrude itself upon the scene.
Yet, there may be a lingering suspicion: a sense that there is a
latent conflict of interest in the physician treating the prospective
donor which is affecting his judgment of the patient's condition. It
might be suggested that a court entertain a motion by relatives for
an injunction to prevent the transplant. This would assure that
some review of the physician's judgment would be available. How-
ever, if such a procedure is made available, its operation must not be
so cumbersome that the organs to be transplanted are no longer
viable by the time the decision is made. A judge might well hold a
hearing at the hospital to determine whether the donor's physician's
46 The consent of the patient to the removal of his organs at death would prob-
ably be construed to carry with it permission to perform those procedures necessary to
maintain the viability of the organs until the time of transplantation. See Onxo Ray.
CoDE ANN. § 2108.01-.03 (Page 1968).
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judgment of brain death is reasonable. If the court feels that the
physician has, more likely than not, allowed his judgment to be af-
fected by the knowledge of the recipient's plight, then it should be
sufficient to remove the basis of the conflict by enjoining the trans-
plantation.
There are at least two major defects to this solution. First the
physician's decision would be reviewed only if the patient had rela-
tives who were prepared to question the diagnosis. Second, the court
is dealing with a field in which it does not itself have professional
competence, and is doing so under emergency conditions. The court
is not the ideal institution to deal with the problem, but, in the ab-
sence of legislation, it may be the only available institution.
The most appropriate solution to the difficulty of achieving a
meaningful review of the treating physician's determination of brain-
death lies in the legislative sphere. Rather than involve a court in
the process at all, it would be more efficient to establish a board of
physicians 47 within each hospital to make the determination of brain
death. Such a board could be composed of three members chosen
from the staff of the hospital, of whom one would be an anesthesiolo-
gist, one a neurologist, and one a specialist of internal medicine.
Where one or more of these specialists is not available from the hos-
pital's medical staff, the position should be filled by an outside
physician from the relevant specialty chosen by the members of the
hospital staff.
It would be the duty of this board to meet upon the call of any
physician who had a patient in the hospital and who he concluded
had reached a state where consciousness could not be regained.48
The only question before the committee would be whether, in its
opinion, the patient had reached the point where he could not re-
gain consciousness. To this end, the board could examine the pa-
tient and have access to any records which it deemed relevant. Only
if the board concluded, by unanimous vote, that the patient was
brain-dead would the treating physician be free to discontinue treat-
ment to the patient. If death were determined to have occurred the
transplant surgeon, with the permission of the treating physician,
47 With respect to analogous boards dealing with abortions see COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-2-50 to -52 (1967); 14 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15.1 (1967). See also Sanders and
Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplanta-
tion, 15 U.C.LA. L. REv. 357 (1968).
48 This procedure would not be applicable in emergency situations; we are con-
sidering only the patient in a relatively stable condition. In the emergency situation
the treating physician would be on his own.
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would be permitted to remove any needed organs from the patient,
assuming, of course, the previous consent of the patient.
It should be provided further that the determination of brain
death by the board would be conclusive on the subject in any court
in the event that the treating physician chose to terminate treat-
ment. If the treating physician refused to terminate treatment after
such a finding, any person liable for the medical expenses of the
patient should be able to resist further payment of these fees for
treatment.
If the board found that the patient might recover conscious-
ness, the treating physician should not be permitted to terminate
treatment. In this situation, it would be appropriate for an injunc-
tion, commanding further treatment, to issue if needed. The court
might rely upon the board, or one of its members, to supervise its
order.
Finally, in the event that the treating physician refused to ask
the board for its opinion on the question of brain death, it would
be appropriate to allow the next of kin or guardian of the patient
to call the matter to the attention of the board, leaving it to the
board to decide whether or not to act on the matter. In this way the
treating physician could not completely foreclose a determination
of the question.
Such a board would serve at least two major functions. First,
it would assure that prior to termination of treatment, suitable ex-
pert judgment was brought to bear on the diagnosis of brain death.
Second, it should quiet fears of the latent conflict of interest in the
transplant situation. Since the board must act by unanimity, the
danger from an unconscious conflict of interest within the treating
physician as between donor and recipient is reduced to the minimum
possible.
In short, the board of physicians envisaged here will substan-
tially lessen the pressure for judicial intervention in some of the
situations previously presented. Review of determinations of brain
death could be achieved at an expert level where it will be most
effective. At the same time, when judicial intervention is needed,
the issues have been molded into a form more easily digested and
acted upon by a court. Instead of having to decide whether a patient
is brain-dead as an original matter, the court is presented with a
narrower issue: whether the board's determination can stand. More-
over, if the court must act to overrule the treating physician, it has
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a natural ally in the board of physicians as well as a source of aid
in implementing its mandate.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Several points emerge from our discussion. In the first place,
both medicine and the law have the same goal relative to the patient.
His chances for recovery, however remote, must be protected and
acted upon. The question centers on the goal in the context of a
patient who has suffered irreversible damage to the cerebral cortex
and who can, therefore, never regain consciousness. Medicine asserts
that there is no hope of recovery from this state. What is the function
of the law?
In cases of medical malpractice, the courts have deferred to
the standard of medical care which is customary in the locality as
determinative of the proper standard of care. This practice is based
on the frank acknowledgement that the treatment of the patient re-
quires an expertise and skill not possessed by the courts or laymen.
The difficulty with adopting this theory of the court's role,
without a close scrutiny of the reasons for doing so, centers in the
fact that the medical profession is adopting an apparently novel
theory of death. And death, like many other human events, is an
event the occurrence of which alters many rights and duties.
The law has come to acknowledge at least three legal considera-
tions involved in the concept of death:
1) Cause of death (legally actionable causation);
2) Period of dying (pain, suffering, and mental anguish as
death approaches); and
3) Moment of death (survivorship determinations). 49
Two other considerations have been suggested:
4) Failure or interruption of mechanical devises for sustain-
ing life (malpractice, breach of warranty, and homicide); and
5) Failure to provide competent resuscitation procedures after
clinical death or during the period of dying (malpractice,
breach of warranty, and homicide).5 0
It is implicit in the previous discussion that the latter two considera-
tions are really subdivisions of the determination of the moment
of death.
In resolving the problem of defining death, it is suggested that
49 Houts and Irwin, Death, 3 COURT Room MEDICINE 16-17.
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medicine is not adopting a new standard. As noted above, on at
least one view, the concept of brain death is implicit in the premises
underlying the historical notion of clinical death. Formerly, medi-
cine could not compensate for the failure of respiration and heart-
beat and without these brain function could not continue. Presently,
medicine's operational concept of death is the absence of heartbeat
and respiration for three to five minutes. Within this time limit the
failure to institute resuscitative measures would constitute malprac-
tice. The only logical reason for this time factor is that within
these limits the cerebral cortex has not suffered irreversible damage
and, consequently, consciousness can be restored. The heart can
often be started well beyond this time period, as can breathing, but
conscious brain function cannot. In this view, the concept of brain
death is but the logical application of the idea behind clinical death.
If the law were to attempt to regulate the definition of death,
it would encounter an area in which it is not equipped to operate, in-
stitutionally or professionally. Indeed, the legal system might be
unable to enforce its own orders. Ultimately, only the physician can
treat the patient. If the members of the medical profession found a
court's rejection of the medical standard of brain death as a legal
standard unbearable, they could easily circumvent it. To maintain
a patient in this twilight state requires a continuing observation of
the patient to the end that the proper biochemical balances are
maintained. It would be virtually impossible to prove a violation of
the court's order if one of the more critical balances were allowed
to get out of control. It is also questionable whether the court could
draw up an order that would give the physician meaningful guidance
in an emergency situation.
Moreover, there seems to be little reason to believe that the
medical profession will adopt a standard that is significantly different
from that which an informed and reasonable legislator or layman
would reach. There is, then, no reason for the courts to become in-
volved in the process of articulating a concept of death different from
brain death.
If the legal system does ratify the concept of brain death, many
problems remain to be solved. They center upon determining what
legal consequences are to attach to the state of brain death. Some
of the more important questions were discussed above. It has not
been possible to provide definitive answers, but only to raise the ques-
tions and suggest some of the pertinent considerations bearing on
their resolution.
